The Neglected Art of Strategic Pricing:
Lessons From Retail Banking
By J.D. Richards , John Reynolds and Matt Hammerstein
Every executive knows that price plays an essential role in determining
the economics of a business. Yet many do not see pricing as a key
responsibility of senior management. Viewing prices as largely beyond their
control, they leave pricing decisions to mid-level technicians who make
critical judgments without understanding the "big picture." As a result,
pricing, which should be a sculptor’s chisel, more often resembles a
workman’s hammer.
When you have multiple products across multiple segments and
geographies, the question of what to charge different types of customers is
never easy. Typically, senior managers respond to complex
pricing challenges in one of three ways: They overdelegate
decisions to individuals much lower in the organization;
they underanalyze the situation by relying on simple default
pricing models; or they employ technology as a silver bullet
solution, supplanting executive judgment. All three responses can lead to
misinformed decisions and, consequently, missed opportunities for sales and
profit growth.
In this article, we discuss each of these three problems in some detail. We
then describe the case of a retail banking client that initially
miscalculated the customer reaction to a series of price changes, then
learned from its mistakes and developed an unusually comprehensive
approach to pricing – one grounded in collecting and integrating the
right customer, competitor and cost information. Such an approach has
given the bank a strategic pricing capability that’s yielding dramatic
improvements in its financial and organizational performance.
The Overdelegation Problem
Price is the variable that divides the value of a
company’s products and services between
customers and shareholders. Nevertheless, most
pricing decisions are made without reference to
the company’s broad strategic choices – whom to
target, with what offer, through which channel,
based on what competitive position. One reason
for this is that pricing issues rarely make it onto
executive committee agendas. Pricing decisions
are made three or four levels
below a division or business
unit leader by a technician
who crunches data. While
executives spend a great deal
of time discussing the design of products, services
or product/service bundles, they do not see price
as integral; it’s decided later, by less senior people
who at best may be given very general direction
on the level at which prices should be set – "at a
slight premium," for example.
Left with little guidance, the technicians’
research often focuses on the appeal of different
product attributes rather than on optimizing the
crucial trade-off between price and volume.
Attributes do drive volume, of course, but how
and why are directly related to the product’s
price. Because everyone recognizes that the
trade-off is difficult to measure beforehand, most
people either dispense with research or use
simplistic approaches.
The Underanalysis Problem
Although a lot of analysis relatively low down in
organizations precedes pricing decisions, the
results are usually based on one of four simple
default pricing models:
- Competitors’ pricing (usually the main factor)
- Status quo, plus or minus a little nudge here
or there
- Short-term earnings target ("What will it take
to hit our numbers?")
- Cost plus a premium
There are two serious weaknesses in all of these
models: First, the pricing decisions reached can
fail to account for the full economic costs; and
second, the predictions of the impact of a price
change on volume and sales are usually little
more than guesses based on past experience.
The cost structure of a product or service is a
vital factor when setting a price because the
ratio of fixed to variable costs of two products
can be quite different. The proportion of the
cost that is variable is crucial, since only
variable costs will be affected by a volume shift
triggered by a price change. The "cost-plus-a-premium"
model does take into account costs, of
course, but seldom the right ones. Cost-plus
price-setters either use fully loaded costs (fixed
and variable) or draw the line between fixed
and variable costs in the wrong place. A
thorough activity-based analysis is needed to
define cost structures accurately.
Having the right customer information is critical.
The right price is the one price that optimizes
customer benefits and company
profits. Some customer information
goes into pricing decisions,
but it is usually derived from
attitudinal surveys (e.g., "Are you
happy with your current price?"). Our experience
suggests that attitudinal surveys alone are poor
predictors of customer behavior; they must be
combined with an analysis of actual buying
behavior to reveal what will motivate customers to
switch to a competing product or service.1

